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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Rule 3(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND QF CASE 
This is a first Appeal from a criminal prosecution of the 
Third Degree, Attempted Burglary heard in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Hon. Tyrone Medley, Judge. 
DISPOSITION IN LOVER COURT 
Appellant was found to be in violation of a Plea in Abeyance 
Agreement made on November 1992 and a guilty plea was 
accepted by Tyrone Medley, Judge on June 11, 1994. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of judgment terminating Plea in 
Abeyance Agreement and reinstatement of agreement; or 
failing that, a new Order to Show Cause hearing before a 
different Judge. 
STATEMENT QF POINTS 
Point 1_._ Defendant may not be sentenced on inaccurate 
information; violation of due process rights of the 5th and 
14th Constitutional Amendments. 
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Point 2. Inadmissible evidence and Hearsay evidence used at 
Order to Show Cause Hearing, an Evidentiary Hearing. 
Point 3. Prison Garb and Restraints prejudicially effected 
defendant's constitutional rights of defense. 
Point 4. Prosecutorial misconduct when prosecutor knowingly 
presented false statements and introduced inadmissible 
evidence and false statements in closing arguments; a 
violation of Utah Rules of Conduct Rule 17, and due process 
clause of the Constitution. 
Point 5. Appellant's Sixth Amendment Constitutional right 
was violated by ineffective assistance of counsel; 
Appellant's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 
denied by lack of meaningful access to the courts. 
Point 6. Court violated defendant's 5th Amendment rights by 
relying on the Diagnostic Report as a basis for sentencing. 
Point 7. Appellant's Eighth Amendment right barring "cruel 
and unusual punishment" was violated by the Utah Board of 
Pardon and Parole, by giving Appellant a termination date 
of January 16, 1999. 
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STATEMENT QF FACTS 
On June 10, 1994 an Order to Show Cause hearing was 
held before Judge Tyrone Medley. Witness Suzanne Vest was 
allowed to use a typed memorandum to aid in her recollection 
and it was presented as an exhibit to Judge Medley as 
evidence. Said memorandum was not the original notes but a 
prepared list of alleged contents of phone calls made by 
Appellant in violation of a Plea in Abeyance agreement. 
The prosecution also played a tape recording into the 
record which was supposedly acquired by some unnamed officer 
who was not present. No chain of evidence was established, 
evidence was not objected to by Appellant*s attorney. 
The Plea in Abeyance agreement was vacated and a guilty 
plea of the Appellant was accepted by the court. 
Appellant*s attorney Richard Mauro of the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association (LDA> made a statement to the court 
about prosecution agreeing to straight probation if 
Appellant would admit to some of the phone calls. The 
Assistant District Attorney Mr. Ybarra, said no such 
agreement existed and the prosecution wanted prison. 
July 11, 1994, Judge Medley rejected AP&P*s 
recommendation of probation and ordered a 90 Day Diagnostic 
evaluation at the Utah State Prison. No objection was 
raised by Mauro even though Appellant had asked for 
immediate sentencing. 
8 
October 3, 1994, Appellant appeared for sentencing 
hearing. Mauro was absent and sent Richard Udey of LDA to 
seek a two week continuance. Appellant told the court he 
was disappointed with Mauro and LDA and requested 
appointment of independent counsel. Appellant requested a 
continuance to be allowed time to examine the Diagnostic 
report which should have been presented to him by September 
23, 1994, 10 days before the sentencing hearing. LDA sent a 
copy on October 4, 1994. 
October 17, 1994, Judge Medley questioned Mauro about 
if there was a conflict of interest. mauro stated no. 
Appellant filed a Notice of Dismissal of Counsel along with 
an affidavit claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Medley recognized receipt of Appellant*s Objection to 
Diagnostic report with affidavit and Notice of Dismissal of 
Counsel with affidavit handed to Medley in court. After 
questioning defendant about knowledge, legal rights and 
options, Medley gave Appellant three choices: (1) retain LDA 
and Mauro; (2) represent himself; <3) hire outside counsel. 
Appellant stated he could not afford outside counsel and 
choose self-representation over LDA. Medley denied 
Appellant*s Request for an Independent Evaluation as set 
forth in Objection to Diagnostic report. 
October 24, 1994, Appellant again requested appointment 
of counsel other than LDA, because he was not able to 
prepare a defense for inside jail. Defendant again 
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requested an independent evaluation to countermand the 
Department of Corrections Diagnostic report, challenging to 
Diagnostic report as grossly inaccurate. New counsel was 
denied. An independent evaluation was denied and Appellant 
was sentenced to a 0 to 5 year term at the Utah State Prison 
based on hearsay evidence and misstatements from the 
diagnostic report. 
February 24, 1995, Appellant was given a termination 
date of January 16, 1999. Making a total of Six (6) years 
Seven (7) months Five (5) where he was under restricted 
liberty or incarceration. 
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ARGUMENTS 
Point 1_._ A defendant has a due process right to be 
sentenced on the basis of accurate information. 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(D) 
provides: 
MIf the ...Defendant,•.alleges any factual 
inaccuracy in the presentence investigation 
report. . . , the court shall, as to each matter-
controverted, make (i) a finding as the 
allegation, or (ii) a determination that no such 
finding is necessary because the matter 
controverted will not be taken into account in 
sentencing.M 
Page 2, Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) "the victim 
had received a call from the defendant stating, "you lie you 
die." 
This statement is untrue and argumentive hearsay 
evidence. This report is being submitted to the judge who 
must make a decision on accurate information. Police 
reports are notoriously biased against the alleged 
perpetrator. There was no police officer named or called to 
state under oath the truth of the matter stated or to be 
cross examined. 
Page 2, (PSI) "The defendant had smashed a bottle of wine in 
the victim* s kitchen." 
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Another untrue, inflammatory hearsay statement based on 
an unknown officer*s speculation. 
Page 4, (PSD "He felt the defendant needed a mental health 
evaluation, mental health treatment and to stay away from 
the victim totally in the future." 
Opinion of prosecutor who is not an expert witness in 
the mental health field. An inflammatory, prejudicial, 
slanderous statement. 
I n
 U.S. v. Mantos-Majia 824 F.2nd 360 (5th Cir. 1987) 
Rule 32 <c>(3)(D> was examined by the court which concluded 
that the Rule serves two functions. First, it protects the 
defendant from being sentenced on inaccurate information. 
Second, it creates an accurate record of the factors on 
which the District Court relied at sentencing. Such a 
record is important because prison or parole officials may 
consider information on a PSI when making correctional or 
parole decisions. See United States v. Velasquez 748 F.2nd 
972, 974 (5th Cir 1984). A failure of the district court to 
comply with Rule 32 (c)(3)(D) may be raised for the first 
time on appeal and requires resentencing. Velasquez, 748 
F.2nd at 873; Petitto, 767 F.2nd at 611; United States v. 
O'Neill, 767 F.2nd 780, 787 (11th Cir. 1985). 
Page 4. (PSI) Prior Record 
Unlawful Sale of Narcotics Dismissed 
DUI, First No Disposition 
DUI No Disposition 
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Destruction of Property 
Open Alcohol Container 
Intoxication 
Disorderly Conduct 
DUI 
Battery 
Open Container 
Assault-Domestic Violence 
Assault on P.0. 
Criminal Mischief 
Vandalism 
DUI 
Public Intoxication 
Dismissed 
Dismissed 
Dismissed 
No Contest 
Dismissed 
Dismissed 
Dismissed 
Refiled Disturbing 
the Peace,Infraction 
Dismissed 
Dismissed 
Dismissed 
Not Guilty 
No Contest 
Sixteen alleged charges on the PSI report that were 
dismissed or had no contest pleas entered all of which are 
not supposed to be used in sentencing. Why are they 
included on the PSI Report? The only reason can be to 
prejudice the judge. Did the judge look at these dismissed 
allegations and use them as a basis for sentencing? Yes. 
Did the Department of Corrections Diagnostic Unit use these 
allegations as a basis for their Diagnostic Report? Yes. 
Did the Department of Corrections use these allegations in 
evaluation for assessments and parole recommendations? Yes. 
Did the Utah Pardon and Parole Board use these allegations 
in sentencing Appellant to 5 years in prison? Yes. 
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Appellant objected to the PSI report within the five 
days in which to object. He received no reply from Reginald 
Swartz concerning these objections. The report was 
submitted in toto to the court. 
Appellant objected to the court about the PSI report 
and the courts response was (tr.123-128) court describes 
objections as not quite "frivolous". 
U.S. v. Muellar, 902 F.2nd 336 (5th Cir 1990) See p. 
346. "C161... The court is required to resolve specifically 
disputed issues of fact if it intends to use those facts as 
a basis for its sentencing.*1 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32(c)(3)(D); United States v. Hurtado, 846 F.2nd 995, 998 
(5th cir). 
11A defendant has a due process right to be sentenced on 
the basis of accurate information." United States v. 
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S. Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed. 2d. 
592 (1972); United States v. Musa, 946 F.2nd 1297, 1306 
(7th Cir. 1991). 
See U.S. v. Simpson, 8 F.3rd 546 (7th Cir 1993). 
8. "Defendant has a due process right to be sentenced only 
on basis of accurate information." U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 
14. 
9. "To succeed on claim that sentencing court considered 
inaccurate information, defendant must demonstrate that 
information before court was inaccurate and that court 
relied on it." Fed Rules Crim. P. Rule 32(c)D, 18 U.S.C.A. 
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See p. 552. M C8,9] A defendant has a due process right 
to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information. ** 
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct 589, 
592, 30 L.Ed. 2d. 592 (1972); United States v. Coonce, 961 
F.2nd 1268, 1275 (7th Cir. 1992). Furthermore, Rule 32 
(c)(3)(d) requires that the sentencing court make a finding 
as the any alleged inaccuracy or a determination that no 
such finding is necessary because the controverted matter 
will not be considered in sentencing. Nonetheless, there 
are few restrictions on the information that a sentencing 
court may consider. United States v. Musa, 946 F,2nd 1297, 
1306 (7th Cir. 1991) To succeed on a claim that a 
sentencing court considered inaccurate information, a 
defendant must demonstrate "that the information before the 
court was inaccurate and that the court relied on it.*1 
Coonce, 961 F.2nd at 1275; Musa, 946 F.2nd at 1306. 
See cases on Inaccurate Information. 
U.S. v. Benson, 836 F.2nd 1133 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(1) Due process is violated when information on which 
defendant is sentenced is materially untrue or is 
misinformation. 
(2) Government must prove facts in pre-sentencing 
report by preponderance of evidence. 
Chapman v. California, 386 US 18, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967). 
11
 . . . the Supreme Court adopted a harmless-error standard 
for consideration of constitutional errors. They were held 
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not to mandate reversal in all instances, but the test that 
must be followed is one of heightened scrutiny: "Before a 
federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court 
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.** 
United States v. Hurtado, 846 F.2nd 995, 998 <5th Cir). 
"The court is required to resolve specifically disputed 
issues of fact if it intends to use those facts as a basis 
for its sentence. FRCP 32(c)(3)(D). 
See cases Sentencing—Prior History. 
U.S. v. Guthrie, 931 F.2nd 564, 572 (9th cir 1991). 
(vacated state court conviction improperly considered 
prior sentence). See p. 570 note 3. **The Constitution 
places similar limitations on the use for sentencing 
purposes of prior invalid convictions. See U. S. y_. Tucker 
404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed. 2d. 592 (1972). 
See p. 571. **The District Attorney did not contest Guthries 
1973 conviction, reinstated his **not guilty** plea, and 
confirmed that the District Attorney had dismissed the 
information against him. See p, 572. **Sentences resulting 
from convictions that have been reversed or vacated because 
of errors of law, or because of subsequently discovered 
evidence exonerating the defendant, are not to be counted.** 
U.S. v. Cammisano, 917 F.2nd 1057, 1062 (8th Cir 1990). 
(government failed to meet burden when agent*s hearsay 
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regarding defendant's involvement in murders and defendant's 
membership in organized crime corroborated by more hearsay. 
U. S. v, Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F. 2nd 1430, 1434 <9th 
Cir.1991). (due process violated when probation officer 
refused defendant's request to be accompanied by counsel at 
presentence interview; district courts rely heavily on 
presentence reports.) 
U.S. v. Edffecomb, 910 F.2nd 1309, 1313 (6th Cir. 1990). 
(resentencing required when defendant objected to 
presentence report and district court failed to make 
specific findings of fact about disputed issues.) 
U.S. v^ Rico, 895 F.2nd 602, 603 (9th Cir, 1990). 
(resentencing required when court responded "noted" and "all 
right" to defendant's objections to presentence report). 
Geor%etowm Law Journal, [Vol 80:14931 
See p. 1526. "The Fifth Amendment prevents a judge 
from considering statements obtained from a defendant in 
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination or 
statements elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. 
See p. 1513-14. "To prevent the contents of the 
presentence report from influencing the adjudication of 
guilt or innocence, Rule 32(c) prohibits the probation 
service from disclosing the contents of the report to the 
trial court unless the defendant has pleaded guilty, been 
convicted, or given written consent. 
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Subject to certain exceptions, the court must disclose 
the report to the defendant and the defendant*s counsel at 
least 10 days before the date of sentencing, unless the 
defendant waives this minimum period. Before imposing 
sentence, the court must give the defendant and defense 
counsel an opportunity to comment on the report and, at the 
court*s discretion, to introduce testimony and other 
evidence relating to any factual inaccuracy. If the 
defendant alleges that the report contains factual 
inaccuracies, the judge must either make a finding as to the 
truth of the allegation or determine that no finding is 
necessary because the court will not consider the 
controverted matter in sentencing. Resentencing is required 
when the sentencing judge fails to make explicit findings.1* 
"Merely to be in custody, with or without trial, was a 
crime.** Nazi Germany (1939) **Mother Night** Kurt Vonnegut, 
Jr. 
"The justice of the community then becomes an 
expression of the unequal degree of power obtaining within 
it: the laws are made by and for the ruling members and 
find little room for the rights of those in subjection. 
First, attempts are made by certain of the rulers to set 
themselves above the prohibitions which apply to everyone. 
Secondly, the oppressed members of the group make constant 
efforts to obtain more power and to have any changes that 
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are brought about in the direction recognised in the laws." 
Sigmund Freud (1932). 
Point 2. Inadmissible evidence and Hearsay evidence used at 
Order to Show Cause Hearing, an Evidentiary Hearing. 
Ybarra argues that Rule 1101 and 1102 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, Rules do not apply to Order to Show Cause 
Evidentiary Hearing. 
Rule 1101. Applicability of rules 
(b)(3)[Rules applicable] to following situations: 
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition, 
sentencing or granting or revocation of probation, issuance 
of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses and search 
warrants and proceedings with respect to release on bail or 
otherwise; 
The exceptions to applicability are very specific and 
deal with cases where the standard of cause is not great. 
Reasonable suspicion is enough cause to issue warrants to 
extradite to revoke probation which was conditionally 
granted. 
A Plea held in Abeyance is not listed as an exception 
to applicability. An order to show cause hearing is not 
listed. And especially an evidentiary hearing; one 
designed to deprive the defendant of his liberty for five 
years or more is not listed under the exception to 
applicability. Mr. Ybarra*s argument is based on the fact 
that he doesn't have one piece of admissible evidence under 
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the Rules of Evidence. The court allowed him to present all 
this evidence and ruled that the defenses objection was 
overruled. The prosecutors office of Salt Lake County and 
the Attorney Generals office do not think the laws and rules 
of the State of Utah apply to them. They think they are 
above the law. From past experience in dealing with both 
Appellant tends to agree that the courts allow them to be 
above the law. 
If the Rules of Evidence and the laws of the State of 
Utah do apply to the Attorney Generals office and the Salt 
Lake County Prosecutors office under Rule 801. Utah Rules 
Of Evidence: 
(c) Hearsay: "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. M 
Rule 803 (5) URE 
(5) Recorded recollection. MA memorandum or record 
concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge 
but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to 
testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made ar 
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in her 
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If 
admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence 
but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered 
by an adverse party.'* 
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Refer to Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing p. 12 of Record 
of Transcript. <tr. p.14, Ln.13) 
Mr, Mauro: "Your Honor, at this point can I ask what 
the witness is looking at while she is testifying? There 
are some Documents—" . 
The Court: "She has some documents in front of her and 
you will certainly get an opportunity to take a look at 
them. I don*t think we are at the stage in the examination 
where it is necessary right now, Mr. Mauro but you will get 
that chance.M 
All the testimony of the witness Suzanne West from this 
point on is read from the two documents she was holding 
which were propounded to be memorandum while fresh in her 
mind of certain events. 
(tr. p.31,1 11) 
Mr. Ybarra: May we have these two marked as States 
Exhibits, please... 
(tr. p.31,1 18) 
The Witness: "These are the March 18, 1993 and the 
November 3, 1993 letters, which I wrote to you setting out 
my memo of calls,.. " 
All of this testimony is based on hearsay evidence. 
Every part of the exception to hearsay in 803 (5) URE is 
violated: 
"Once had knowledge" 
"insufficient recollection" 
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 matter was fresh in her memory" 
"may not be received as an exhibit" 
This is a gross violation of the Rules of Evidence 
perpetrated by the Salt Lake County Prosecutor and allowed 
by the Third District Court with very weak objection from 
Legal Defenders office, 
The court made a statement concerning these hearsay, 
slanderous letters which the Appeals Court should apply. 
<tr. p.33, Ln.l3> 
The Court; "Can you excise o u t — " 
The whole testimony of Suzanne Vest should be "excised 
out" because it is all based on faulty recollection, lies, 
and slanderous statements of an incompetent witness. All 
the statements attributed to the defendant are inaccurate, 
slanderous lies, fabricated by the witness*s alcohol and 
drug distorted mind. 
Lunce v. Qverlade, 244 F,2nd 108. [When the Court] ... 
"permitted incompetent damaging hearsay evidence to be 
introduced against the defendant...Che is] deprived of his 
right to due process of law. " 
Rule 802. Hearsay Rule. 
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or 
by these rules." 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in 
admitting this hearsay evidence into the record. 
Order to Show Cause: Transcript (June 6, 1994) 
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Ctr. p. 3, Ln. 15, 16, 17) 
Mr. Ybarra: MThere is a very long history of this 
matter Your Honor: domestic violence, stalking, 
burglarization of a victim in this case: Suzanne Vest.*1 
If you check the record you will find no convictions of 
domestic violence. The only arrest for domestic violence 
was refiled as disturbing the peace by order of Judge Van 
Sciver when she heard that Suzanne West was lying to the 
police and that it was me who asked the neighbors to call. 
Mr. Ybarra repeatedly brings up accusations of stalking 
and yet there has never been an arrest for stalking. 
Suzanne Vest had her friend Ron Yengich and fellow lawyer 
Van Sciver mention the stalking laws to the prosecutors and 
the magistrate prior to the setting of bail. Through this 
influence Suzanne Vest was able to get the bail set at 
£50,000. Vhen cross examined at the preliminary hearing 
about these accusations, Suzanne Vest was proved to be a 
1 iar. 
There was never any burglarization of the victim. A 
window on her door was broke. There was no accusation of 
theft or assault or any other felonious activity which are 
elements of burglary. The attempted burglary was part of 
the plea in abeyance agreement because Ybarra insisted that 
there should be some felony charge named. No evidence of an 
actual burglary was ever presented in either the preliminary 
hearing or any other court proceedings. 
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<tr. p. 3, Ln.19-25) 
Mr. Ybarra: "The defendant, when served with the Order 
os Show Cause, I think it was November, absconded... 
Black*s Law Dictionary, **Absconded - To go in a 
clandestine manner out of the jurisdiction of the courts, or 
to lie concealed, in order to avoid their process. To hide, 
conceal, or absent oneself clandestinely, with the intent to 
avoid legal process. Fleeing from arresting or prosecuting 
officers of the state.*1 
Ybarra is implying that Appellant fled to avoid 
prosecution. The police know where Appellant lives. 
Appellant was there every day of the week. Appellant chose 
not to attend the Order to Show Cause hearing because he 
knew it would be the farce that it was. The judge had all 
the evidence presented to him prior to the hearing and had 
already made up his mind before Appellant ever stepped into 
the court room, 
(tr, p. 3, Ln.23) 
Mr. Ybarra: **Ve believe there are two things. He 
poses a risk of danger to the victim, Suzanne Vest, and 
secondly that he is a risk of flight in this case.** 
Appellant had not seen Suzanne Vest for almost two 
years prior to this hearing. The prosecutor presented a 
police report to the judge prior to this hearing where 
Suzanne Vest had convinced the Salt Lake City police that 
Appellant was stalking her and that he was going to kidnap 
her daughter and that he might be in her house waiting to 
24 
kill her. The ravings of a mad woman. Appellant told the 
court and the prosecutors that they should make their key 
witness go in for a psychological examination. She is 
obviously to the point of psychosis or suffering from drug-
related paranoia. The truth of the matter was that 
Appellant was home, 18 miles away helping my father repair a 
shed in the back of their house. 
<tr. p. 6, Ln.ll, 12, 13) 
The Court: "When the Information was first filed, bail 
was set in the amount of $50,000. It was subsequently 
reduced to 425,000." 
When the Information was first presented, the bail was 
set at $10,000. After calls from Yengich and Van Sciver, 
the bail was raised to $50,000. My first Attorney Mr. Bruce 
Oliver had this information confirmed by Yengich and Van 
Sciver and also had a taped interview with Suzanne Vest 
confirming this happened. Suzanne Vest called Appellant*s 
sister and asked what bail she would go and'then got the 
court to make it higher so he couldn't bailout. Appellant 
had told Ms. Vest that he was going to the Utah Bar with the 
letters she forged in his n&im And W A S going to file 
malpractice suit against her for the way she botched the 
other two cases in which she was his attorney; Ms. Vest had 
failed to file objections in Support case thereby causing 
Appellant to loose half of his visitation and having to pay 
twice as much in child support. She had already been forced 
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to resign from Jones, Waldo, etc. for her action in the 
divorce case she was handling for Appellant. 
Point 3. Prison Garb and Restraints prejudicially effected 
defendant's constitutional rights of defense. 
People v. Fierro, 821 P.2nd 1302 (Cal 1991). 
11
 It is, of course, well settled that during a trial •• a 
defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any 
kind in the courtroom while in the jury's presence, unless 
there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints." 
(People v. Duran, 1976 16 cal 3d 282, 545 P.2nd 1322)(People 
v\ Cox, 1991 809 P.2nd 351) (People v. Stankewitz 793 P.2nd 
23)" 
"We believe that possible prejudice in the minds of the 
jurors, the affront to human dignity, the disrespect for the 
entire judicial system which is incident to unjustifiable 
use of physical restraints as well as the effect such 
restraints have upon a defendant's decision to take the 
stand, all support our continued adherence to the Harrington 
rule." People v. Duran 545 P.2nd 1322. 
"As early as 1871, we noted in People v. Harrington, 
(1871) 42 Cal 165, the common law rule that a prisoner 
"brought into the presence of a Court for trial..was 
entitled to appear of all manner of shackles or bonds...(Id. 
at 167). As we explained: "CAlny order or action of the 
Court which, without evident necessity, imposes physical 
burdens, pains and restraints upon a prisoner during the 
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progress of his trial, inevitable tends to confuse and 
embarrass his mental faculties, and thereby materially to 
abridge and prejudicially effect his constitutional right of 
defense...(Id. at 168). ** 
"Thus, it was recognized early on that the use of 
shackles in court could prejudicially affect the rights of 
the defendant, not just because of the impact they might 
have on the jury, but because of their unsettling effect on 
the defendant and consequentially * his constitutional rights 
of defense.** (Harrington, supra, 42 Cal. at p. 168). 
Defendant was forced to attend all hearings, 
evidentiary, sentencing etc. in Prison garb and chains and 
shackles. The only relief from the court was to ask the 
defendant to please Mstop jiggling that chain** (tr. p. 51, 
Ln.25). 
**Defendant has constitutional right not to be compelled 
to appear in court in identifiable prison garb.** U. S. v. 
Pina 844 F.2nd 1 (1st Cir 1988). 
Point 4_^  Prosecutorial Misconduct when the prosecutor 
knowingly presented false statements, introduced 
inadmissible evidence and false statements in closing 
arguments; in violation of Utah Rules of Conduct, Rule 17, 
and the due process clause, 
**A criminal defendant bears a substantial burden when 
attempting to show that prosecutorial improprieties 
constitute reversible error. United States v. Diaz-Carreon, 
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915 F.2nd 951, 956 (5th Cir 1990). Improper prosecutorial 
comments require reversal only if the comments substantially 
affected the defendant's right to a fair trial, Id. In 
evaluating any effect on the right to a fair trial, we 
consider three factors: the magnitude of the prejudicial 
effect of the remarks, the efficacy of any cautionary 
instruction, and the strength of the evidence of the 
defendant's guilt. Id. The misconduct complained of must be 
examined in the context of the trial in which it occurred." 
United States v. Willis, 6 F.3d 257, 264 (5th Cir 1993). 
See United States v. Anderson, 574 F.2nd 1347 (5th Cir 
1993). "...the knowing use by the prosecution of false 
evidence or perjured testimony which is material to the 
issues in a criminal trial is a denial of due process. A 
conviction obtained by the use of such evidence cannot be 
permitted to stand.'* Id. at 1355. 
S e e
 U.S. v. Willis, 6 F.3d 257 (5th cir 1993) at p. 
263. "Counsel is accorded wide latitude during closing 
argument, and this court gives deference to a district 
courts determination regarding whether those arguments are 
prejudicial and/or inflammatory, " United States vJ Murphy, 
996 F.2nd 94, 97 (5th Cir 1993) "Our task in reviewing a 
claim or prosecutorial misconduct is to decide whether the 
misconduct casts serous doubt upon the correctness of the 
juries verdict." United Stated v. Helley, 981 F.2nd 1464, 
1473 (5th Cir). 
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Instances of Prosecutorial Misconduct—Order to Show Cause 
Hearing, June 6, 1994. 
<tr. p. 3, Ln.13-18) 
Mr. Ybarra: "Your Honor, with regard to holding the 
defendant, that would be the state*s recommendation to the 
Court on the current status. There is a very long history 
of this matter, Your Honor: domestic violence, stalking, 
burglarization of the victim in this case: Suzanne West." 
As stated on previous page, all these accusations are 
incorrect slanderous lies, 
(tr. p. 3, Ln.19-25) 
Mr. Ybarra: "The defendant, when served with the Order 
to Show Cause, I think it was last November, absconded and 
wasn't brought before the court until, I assume recently, 
the last several weeks" 
"We believe there are two things. He poses a risk of 
danger to the victim, Suzanne West, and secondly that he is 
a risk of flight in this case.** 
Again this was explained on an earlier page. Suzanne 
West is only the victim in the sense that it was her house 
that Appellant allegedly broke the window in. She was never 
threatened physically in any way. The prosecution has 
repeatedly brought in past allegations of crimes to try to 
prove his case. This is clearly a violation of the Rules of 
Evidence. 
(tr. p. 59, Ln.l) 
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Mr. Ybarra: " . . . unrebutted testimony." 
All the testimony was rebutted. Appellant denied ever 
making any threats other than the threat of legal 
malpractice for the botched legal representations by Suzanne 
Vest. The courts have effectively blocked Appellant's right 
of redress by putting no contact orders on him. Now if he 
serve Ms. Vest with a Summons he will violate his parole 
agreement and be sent back to prison. She threatened that 
much to Appellant's father in a recent phone conversation. 
Ms. Vest also wrote a letter to the Parole Board stating 
that she wanted a no contact order included as part of 
parole which the Parole Board included as part of the 
special conditions of parole. This is another attempt by 
Ms. Vest to avoid prosecution for malpractice and forgery 
charges. 
<tr. p. 59, Ln.4) 
Mr. Ybarra: MThose contacts were abusive. They were 
threatening." 
Inflammatory and immaterial comments make in an effort 
to prejudice the judge. Again any "threats" were for legal 
malpractice and criminal prosecution for forgery. Even 
though the Appellant has repeatedly asserted that Ms. Vest 
committed forgery and even gave a copy of the forged 
documents to Mr. Grant of LDA no action has been taken 
against Ms. Vest, 
(tr. p. 62, Ln.?> 
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Mr. Ybarra: "That was the whole essence of this 
domestic violent situation, and not only was there repeated 
contact that occurred over a long period of time, it was 
very abusive contact in many instances.M 
Total lies and prejudicial, inflammatory statements 
concocted by Mr. Ybarra to inflame the judge toward the 
defendant. Mr. Ybarra repeatedly has made these kinds of 
untrue slanderous statements before the courts. He stated 
that the Defendant threw a Christmas tree through the window 
in an effort to inflame Judge Sawaya in earlier proceedings. 
The constant reference to domestic issues in an attempted 
burglary case are all in an attempt to prejudice the court 
because at the time the O.J. Simpson trial was on the news 
and on everyone minds. Back in 1992 Ybarra was talking 
Stalker, this Stalker that; and "fatal attraction*1 because 
that was news at the time. Defendant advised them that they 
watched to much TV and it was corroding their minds. 
MAnd the court relied upon it*', U, S. v: Simpson, 8 
F.3rd 546 (?th Cir 1993). 
(tr. p. 65, Ln.25-...) 
The Court: ** I agree with Mr. Ybarra*s assessment, and 
the Court does so find, no matter how you define 
**substantial compliance,** when you have an allegation that a 
victim is being harassed to the extent their home was broken 
into and that personal property contained therein was 
destroyed and damaged.** 
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Mr. Mauro argued that the Plea in Abeyance had been 
"substantially** complied because the Appellant had completed 
all of the stipulation contained in the agreement and asked 
the court* s permission to research "substantially** as it 
applied in case history. The Court denied his request with 
the preceding admonition. In Gilmore v. Red Top Cab Co. of 
Wash, et.al., 17 P. 2nd 887 (1933), "Substantially** may mean 
"part** or "about". It is a term which has been defined to 
mean "about; actually; competently; essentially.** In South 
Penn Oil Co. v. Knox, 68 V.Va 362, 69 S.E. 1020, "The Court 
there held that the term ** substantial ly" meant bounded 
**about** or "in the main** as designated, and not **wholly** or 
"completely" so. 
Judge is alleging that the Plea in Abeyance Agreement 
was not "substantially complied** with because the Appellant 
broke into and destroyed property in the victims house, The 
Appellant is not accused of violating the Plea agreement by 
committing further burglaries. The alleged violation is for 
making phone calls many of which had to do with Appellant as 
Pro Se Attorney in cases which Ms. Vest botched. 
Utah. Code of Criminal Procedure, 77-2a-4."<l)...If, 
following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the 
defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term 
or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may 
terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and 
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impose sentence against the defendant for the offense to 
which the original plea was entered." 
<tr, p. 66, Ln,17-...) 
The Court: "When that one condition is really the 
heart of what the agreement is all about and that seems to 
be the case hear.** 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND MOTION FOR ORDER 
HOLDING PLEA IN ABEYANCE, Case No. 921901158FS Page 2. 
3(b) "Shall initiate no contact whatsoever with the victim 
Suzanne Vest, or her family, at her home, place of 
employment, or elsewhere; however, contact initiated by the 
victim, Suzanne West with the defendant shall not be 
considered a violation by the defendant of this plea in 
abeyance;" This clause was added because the attorneys to 
both sides of the plea in abeyance agreement knew of the 
further legal entanglements between the Appellant and Ms. 
Vest. Both Attorneys (Ybarra and Grant) knew of the forged 
document and other malpractice acts of Ms. Vest and agreed 
that further contact was allowable. The "heart" of this 
clause is that the Appellant not initiate the contact, his 
attorney could. Appellant was acting as Pro Se Attorney 
when making phone contacts. He was being sued by two of the 
former litigants in cases Ms. Vest was attorney of record 
on. Ms. Vest failed to respond to request for information 
thus necessitating the direct phone contact. 
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Mr. Ybarra made this concession about contact in the 
original agreement and then in subsequent proceedings 
succeeded in convincing the Court and Medley that there was 
to be absolutely no contact under any circumstances. This 
misleading argument convinced the court to find Appellant in 
violation of the Plea in Abeyance Agreement, 
(tr. p. 69, Ln. 10) 
The Court: MI think it is the type of what I would 
call "mental torture.'* 
(tr. p. 78, Ln.9) 
The Court: "serious case of harassment" (Ln. 13) "a 
taped telephone call from your client. And that taped 
telephone call, in my opinion, was clearly stalking, clearly 
harassment.M 
Again the Court relied on prosecutions misstatements, 
lies and slander to make judgment. There was never any 
charges filed about stalking, harassment, mental torture, 
these allegations and opinions are all a" product of 
prosecutorial misconduct. The memorandum of points for the 
Order to Show cause hearing do not mention violation for 
stalking, harassment or mental torture. All these ideas are 
put forth by the prosecutor and "the court relied on them", 
(tr. p. 81, Ln.81) 
The Court: "...but it could also be the standard 
scenario where the female partner, as a result of the 
dynamics of the situation, doesn't think all that clearly 
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and is willing to make all kinds of concessions. I mean 
after all, I have had people in that situation literally 
hobble in here and ask the Court to drop charges of 
whatever.M 
"The Supreme Court has explained that 'when the trial 
judge is discovered to have had some basis for rendering a 
biased judgment, his actual motivations are hidden from 
view, and we must presume the process was impaired." 
Valesquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254, 263, 106 S.Ct. 617, 623, 
88 L.Ed. 2d. 598 (1986). Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 
3(c) (1972) (Judges should disqualify themselves when their 
impartiality "might reasonably be questioned".) "Trial 
proceedings before a biased judge are presumptively unfair 
and such unfairness is reason enough to grant a writ of 
habeas corpus." See Walker v. Lockhart, 763 F.2nd 942, 960 
(8th Cir 1985). 
At this point the Court is totally convinced that the 
Appellant is some crazed stalker out to murder Suzanne Vest. 
The point of the Order to Show Cause hearing was about 
alleged phone calls and the court has taken all of Ybarra's 
slanderous lies and made this the case. If the Prosecutor 
thought he had a real case he would have filed an 
Information and brought forth the charges. Instead he made 
unsubstantiated allegation in open court in an attempt to 
prejudice the court and he succeeded. This is a gross 
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violation of the due process clause and every other right of 
the Appellant. 
(tr, p. 128, Ln.ll) 
The Court: "... considering the background and history 
of this case and background and history of you and the 
victim in this particular case, that her fear is reasonable, 
that it was a clear violation of probation.*' 
Again the **court relied on it" taking allegations in 
past dismissed cases, cases with no basis in truth, cases 
ordered by other courts to be amended and dismissed, these 
are the things the court relied upon to make its decision. 
Georgetown Law Review [Vol. 80:13413 
See p. 1432. ** . . . she [prosecutor] may not refer to previous 
convictions, current guilty pleas, or other bad acts of the 
defendant.'* U.S. v. Lonedo^, 929 F.2nd 568, 574 (10th Cir) 
(no reversal required when prosecutor referred to 
defendant*s previous bad acts because judge gave effective 
curative instruction). 
See p. 1433. "The prosecutor may not knowingly present 
false testimony and has a duty to correct testimony that she 
knows is false. The prosecutor also may not attempt to 
introduce inadmissible evidence.** 
See p. 1435, "The prosecutor must confine her opening 
statement and closing argument to admissible evidence on the 
record and to permissible inferences from that evidence.** 
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"Repeated misstatements that go uncorrected may be grounds 
for ordering a new trial.*' 
Point 5. Appellant's Sixth Amendment Constitutional right 
was violated by ineffective assistance of counsel; 
Appellant's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 
denied by lack of meaningful access to the courts. 
"A right to access to the courts is based upon the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to petition all 
branches of the government for redress of grievances; the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee of due process; 
and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel," 
"The Supreme Court has articulated a two-prong test for 
determining whether a litigant has been denied effective 
assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 
2052 (1984). [First] "... the defendant must show that 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard for 
reasonableness." 
(1) Counsel has duty to make reasonable investigations 
or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
invest igat ions unnecessary. 
a. Appellant's attorney Richard Mauro of the Legal 
Defenders Association failed to request an independent 
diagnostic report even though (1) Appellant pointed out to 
him the inaccuracies of the Department of Corrections 
Diagnostic Report. (2) Legal Defenders has their own 
psychologist who could have prepared a report. (3) Mauro 
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failed to supply Appellant with requested police reports 
concerning alleged battery and domestic-violence charges 
which were dismissed; which were in his possession and which 
would have controverted allegations and accusations made by 
the Diagnostic staff* 
b. Mauro failed to investigate past performances of 
D. A. Ybarra concerning false statements; reneging on oral 
plea agreements; relying on inaccurate police reports to 
build this case. Subsequently, Mauro was "hoodwinked" into 
convincing Appellant into admitting to phone calls which he 
never made; allowing hearsay tape to be played into the 
record without objection; all to appease the D.A. because of 
a promise of a recommendation of straight probation. 
(1) Appellant had repeatedly warned Mauro to be 
prepared for this prosecutorial misconduct; Appellant has 
had past experience with Ybarra*s tactics. Appellant told 
Mauro which past cases to pull because Ybarra had used 
police reports from dismissed cases to make arguments in the 
bail hearings; all of which were hearsay, untrue speculation 
on the part of police. Appellant argued against allowing 
hearsay memorandum and tape recording but Mauro convinced 
him that Ybarra would recommend straight probation. 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 77-32-1, •• Minimum 
standards provided by the county for defense of indigent 
defendants. (3) Provide the investigatory and other 
facilities necessary for a complete defense;". The 
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Appellant petitioned the court for an independent evaluation 
to countermand the negative, grossly inaccurate evaluation 
from the Department of Corrections. The LDA has a 
psychologist who could have provided the necessary 
evaluation. The Court would not "pay" for an independent 
evaluation and would make none of the ruling necessary for 
the Appellant to get his own for the defense. 
[Second] M. . . the defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel*s performance, 
the result of the proceedings would have been different.1' 
Id. Strickland at 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
1. The court relied heavily on the hearsay memorandum, 
the tape and the Diagnostic Report in his decision for 
commitment to 5 years in prison. 
2. Richard Maura through LDA had access to a 
psychologist who should have made an evaluation and it would 
have magnified the bias shown by the Department of 
Corrections Diagnostic Report. As spelled out in another 
Point the Diagnostic Report is completely false, bias, and 
slanderous. 
3. Mauro had in his possession or could easily have 
acquired documents and police reports requested by 
Appellant. The Diagnostic is an adversary setting in which 
commitant must defend themselves against accusations of the 
staff. These police reports would have supplied the proof 
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of Appellant*s truthfulness and thus drastically changed the 
negative adverse Diagnostic Report. 
4. The court [Medley] was convinced by the hearsay 
evidence; memorandum of the phone calls and the tape of the 
D.A.*s contention that Appellant was a "stalker** type. This 
was further bolstered by other police reports which Ybarra 
presented to Medley. These accusations should have been 
brought forward in an indictment or information instead of 
through prosecutorial misconduct. The Appellant should have 
and the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him 
instead of these statements made in open court in violation 
of the Rules of Conduct. 
5. There was no chain of evidence shown or no 
authentication proved that the tape was valid. Mauro 
allowed this hearsay tape to be presented as evidence with 
no objection. Mauro claimed to have previously listened to 
said tape and assured Appellant that there was nothing 
harmful on the tape. Mauro was acting under the assumption 
that D.A. Ybarra would recommend straight probation and so 
allowed this without objection. A minimal investigation 
into the character of the prosecutor would have cured this 
mistake. 
M
. . .the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation . . is 
effectively denied to a criminal defendant when out of court 
statements, made outside a defendant*s presence, are 
introduced at trial and the maker of the statements is not 
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present, does not take the stand, or invokes a privilege so 
as to deprive the defendant an opportunity to cross-
examine. " United States v. Brady, 579 F.2nd 1121, 1129 <9th 
Cir 1978). (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 
124-26, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968). 
^
e e
 Strickland at 2068. "The defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would 
have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. " 
When an agreement is made prior to a hearing it should 
be in writing. Mauro should have got the agreement of 
straight probation in writing from Ybarra. Mauro gave up 
the whole defense because of an oral agreement that was not 
kept. Ordinary objections would have kept all of the 
prejudicial memorandum out under Rule 801 (5). The tape 
could have been kept out because no chain of evidence was 
established. The officer who was supposed to testify didn't 
even show; presumably because of the backroom agreement 
between Mauro and Ybarra. The prosecution had no evidence 
other than inadmissible evidence and Mauro assisted in its 
entry into the record. 
Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2nd 1443, 1446 (1985). "An 
incarcerated defendant may not meaningfully exercise his 
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right to represent himself without access to law books, 
witnesses, or other tools to prepare a defense.** 
11
 . . . a defendant in jail is constitutionally entitled 
to conduct his own defense...he cannot be confined to his 
jail simply to look at the four walls and appear on the day 
of trial to defend himself. ...the rejection of an attorney 
to conduct his defense cannot be considered as a waiver of 
the reasonable access to the resources necessary to defend 
himself.*1 (See p. 1448 Hug, Circuit Judge, concurring; 
Milton.) 
**Past criminal activity is one of the most critical 
factors in the process of assessing punishment, for whatever 
purpose punishment might be inflicted.** ** Improperly 
admitted evidence of past criminal conduct is even more 
damaging in the penalty hearing that it is in a guilt-
determining proceeding. . . ** Estate of Mitcham v. Triple S, 
Trucking, 823 p.2nd 327 (N.M. App 1994). 
People v. Pierro, 821 P.2nd 1302 (Cal 1991). • Marsden error 
at p. 1311. **Vhen a defendant seeks to discharge his 
appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and 
asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must 
permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention 
and to relate specific instances of the attorney*s 
inadequate performance. [citation] A defendant is entitled 
to relief if the record clearly shows that the first 
appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation 
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[citation] or that defendant and counsel have become 
embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that 
ineffective representation is likely to result [citation] 
(People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal 3d 833, 854, 251 Cal Rptr. 
227, 760 P.2nd 423; see also People v. Marsden (1970) 465 P. 
2nd 44). 
ffordftren v. Milliken, 762 F. 2nd 851 (1985) at 853. "Access 
to the courts * encompasses all the means a defendant or 
petitioner might require to get a fair hearing from the 
judiciary on all charges brought against him or grievances 
alleged by him." Qilmore v. Lynch 319 F. Supp 105, aff's 
sub nom, Younger v\ Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 250 
(1971). 
Point 6. Court violated defendant*s 5th Amendment rights by 
relying on the Diagnostic Report as a basis for sentencing. 
The Department of Corrections Diagnostic evaluation is 
designed to force people sent there by court order to admit 
to crimes. The program is interrogation as defined in cases 
involving the Fifth Amendment. Inmates are threatened with 
prison instead of the possibility of programs if they don't 
admit to allegation made by the Department of Corrections 
Staff. Inmates are locked in their double bunk 8 foot by 10 
foot cells for 23 hours a day. If they don't admit to 
allegation they are not let out for meals or for exercise. 
These are examples of torture to force inmates to admit to 
other crimes. The staff never advise inmates of the Fifth 
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Amendment rights. See U_S. v» Harrington 923 r.jnc i-;vi 
<91h Cir 1991 ) . 'Aithnut; a court may consider -. wiae 
v&: >•. ' ' •.;.'• ..' r.tencd i ip; a d efendant, a ::oi irt 
may c v consider information obtained i n violation of the 
privilege agaic -- self-Incr :mlna + i.->n 1 ones v. Cardwell, 
686 F. 2nd , " ~ ^iiZ. 
Fifth Amendment
 : I ivi lee— applied ~ . cca~t- court's. use -: 
a defendant* s statemeias in st±iitenci: vf ihe defendant. i 
There, the defendant made incriminating statements t-
state probation officer after receiving a court ordei • to 
,,>,,~_Vvt . .. • :.iestions4 The probation officer also was 
aggressive seeking confessions of additional crimes 
without giving che- defendant warnings under Miranda v. 
Anzond , ~ ~ '> r' " ^ " *' 86 S. Ct, 1 f=•":-" • ' -*- (1966 > . 
M
 based or these circumstances, w«- jL.'cjatd cca •'"h^  
statements wei <-- i nvoZ untary, H Jones, 686 F, 2nd a: 757, We 
held that - ;cc .;••:-- ..• : , -:.- - • .•'_•.•-.- •• 
statements bv the sentencing judge violated the defendant's 
Fifth Amendment. rights _l •; > e •• . ' '-. Pens__y_ ?^ jLl * 
9 0 2 F. 2 nd - • - •  '- ; — -
 : • . E L±± . :. .:,, : ,• :-, c .,.. • 
made incriminating statements t c therapists . :. a ccur r 
crdeie:: psvehiatric riocram. The therapist assured the 
defe: ;.-«: ' • . **,.:• • would i io i: be i eve ales :i to an y 
LCUI" a:,<: *.,.-.* • : c cooperation was u necessary for successful 
treatment" I d_ at 1465. We held that the use of the 
defendant's statements by the state sentencing board :l n 
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imposing as exceptional minimum sentence violated the 
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. l_d ait 1466. Ve stated 
that even if an exceptional sentence was justified, "it may 
not be based on statements C the defendant] made in post-
conviction, court-ordered, confidential treatment." _M_. Ve, 
therefore, vacate Harrington's sentence and remand for 
resentencing. In resentencing Harrington, the district 
court shall not consider the psychiatric evaluation. 
See Pens v. Bail, 902 F.2nd 1464 (9th Cir 1990). "In Jones 
v. Cardwell, 686 F.2nd 754 (9th Cir 1982). "Ve held where 
"the state*s agent seeks for the convicted defendant a 
confession of additional criminal activity and the 
confession is used to enhance a defendant's sentence, we 
think it beyond peradventure that the defendant may properly 
claim the protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination" IiL_ a"^  756. 
The Court and Judge Medley depended on the Department 
of Corrections evaluation as his reasoning for sentencing 
the Appellant to five years or more in the Utah State 
Prison. Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress the 
evaluation; filed a Motion for and Independent Evaluation 
to be used by the defense. Both these motions were denied. 
Medley labeled Motions as "almost frivolous" and refused to 
address the misinformation in court. By allowing only one 
side of the story to be presented, the court unfairly tipped 
the scales in favor of the prosecution. The Appellant was 
45 
sentenced based upon this •misinformation in violation of the 
Fifth Amendments pr i v i ! ejze against self-incrimination. 
Pain t 7 /•» : * * * * *-'v- \^.ment i I ght barring "cruel 
and unusua , punishmen' *,.-_ - .elated by the Utah Board of 
Pardon., and Paro 1 e » by giving .Appe 11 ant a terminat ion d.ate 
o : :.:.••... • 1 6, 1 999. 
Georgetown Law Journal, [Vo1: 80:14931 p. 1616. 
H
 The c-'ue ^ * •: usual punishment clause limits 
criminal p..:.:. ;.nh ' ays: (1) it imposes, 
substantitive limits. on what can be made criminal and 
punished as such; (2) it proscribes the kind of punishment 
that can be imposed; (3) it prohibits excessive punishment. M 
Appellant was given a term! nation date of January 16, 
1999. Making a total of Six (6> years Seven (7) months 
Five (5) where he was under restricted liberty or 
incarceration. The legal limit for punishment for a third-
degree felony in the State of Utah is five (5) years. 
Appellant's sentence is one (1) year, seven (7) months and 
five (5) days beyond the statutory limit. 5i_S: v. Paris, 
812 F,2nd 471 (9th Cir. 19S7) at "When there :I s a 
substantial disparity in sentences imposed on defendants 
engaged * h- same - r I m: i\a . ac t i v : t v, and a defendant * s 
c." n :•:"-*. ' . * - implicated • - >- ' 
reasons for • the disparity must be "readily discernible* iicm 
the record. United States v. Hall, 778 P.2nd 1427, 1428 
(91 h C i r 19 8 5) . A p p e 11 a n t i s b e :i n g i: u n i s h e d f a i • :i i i e x c ess 
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of what is allowed by law. Resentencing should be ordered 
which will comply with Utah Law. 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant*s rights have been violated in many ways 
by the Prosecutor, the Court, and the Parole Board. People 
cannot be sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information. 
Appellant was sentenced in the basis of inaccurate 
information and it has affected every phase of the judicial 
process. Once this misinformation is allowed on any 
governmental record it is next to impossible to remove. The 
Appellant will haunted for the rest of his life by this 
misinformation. 
The only basis for the termination of the Plea in 
Abeyance agreement was hearsay or inadmissible evidence. 
The Prosecution never produced one piece of solid evidence, 
an yet was able to get all of his misstatements and lies 
onto the record. The Court used these lies as the main 
basis for sentencing the Appellant to five (5)' years or more 
in the Utah State Prison. The Prosecutor, knowing that his 
case was filled with perjured testimony and misstatement, 
lies and slander proceeded unincumbered over State and 
Federal Law, and the Court allowed it. 
The Appellant*s counsel was grossly inadequate, 
hampered no doubt by over work from LDA. Appellant has had 
five (5) attorneys from LDA on this case at different times. 
Each and everyone has came into court unprepared, usually 
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without even a copy of the file. Appellant tried to get 
independent counsel but the court would not appoint any 
w:': : " ' *-"':. I b :i s a • :onf 1 :I ::;t c: f 
iii!.erest • \avt- a i. : ncampe'T..ent. a t t o r n e y . 
The Department; Corrections Diagnostic Unit i s an 
exteIIsion of po 1 i<- •• - i..* .-rrogation. The rights of inmates 
forced to go there are- grossly violated. Appellant 
attempted to get relief for Maura but he wouldn't answer a 
letter. Appellant* s c i v i ] i • i g h t,: s we re grossly violated and 
a civ i1 su i t wi11 be filed. 
The Utah Pardon and Parole Board is omnipotent. There 
is no redress of grievances from there decisions. Appellant 
was afraid to object to the January 1999 Termination date 
because of repercussions which could y~^~-y: '• •-• r.'arcerated 
ui it 11 that date. 
CONCLUSION 
The P1 e a i i J A be y a n c e A g i e e me n t wa s f' s ubs t a n t i a 11 y * * 
complete when the Order to Show Cause hearing was held. If 
the Prosecution had solid reasons for bringing charges, they 
s h o u 1 d h a* : e we n t t h i o u sr h t h e i i s: h t c h a n n e 1 s a n d b i o u c: h t 
I_J I.J \ „> 
charges. The fact of the matter is that they had no so] id 
evidence, onlv - he raving oi a alcohol i-~ an:; ":i 'ig addict who 
i.ari G:. T. • • . : . ' . • - • -. .- "I h e 
Appellant has repeatedly tried to get -ic i ]: r-_• r Me. Ves-* by 
offering to pa;; r for counselling. Sh*-- -"hoos- not to seek 
Iie 1 p.. She has 1 ived :i i i £eai • o:f s o m e - ,: -• a iting into h e r 
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house and killing her for many years before Appellant met 
her at Highland Ridge Hospital. Apparently her ex-husband 
tortured her. Appellant cannot be held responsible for all 
the problems in her life. Appellant avoided forcing 
prosecution of this case because he feared of the harm it 
would do to Ms. Vest. She almost broke down as a result of 
the preliminary hearing. Appellant would have been 
convicted of Criminal Mischief a class B misdemeanor at the 
most. These lies and misinformation can not be allowed to 
continue. Appellant has asked the court for a restraining 
order against Ms. Vest because she constantly calls 
Appellant*s children and tries to get them to come stay at 
her house. Her last call was less that a month prior to the 
Order to Show Cause hearing. 
Appellant prays to Appeals Court will look under the 
false information, the lies, the conjecture and order a new 
Order to Show Cause hearing. The Plea in Abeyance Agreement 
should be brought back into effect and allowed- to proceed as 
agreed upon in 1992. Sanctions should be issued against Mr. 
Ybarra for his misconduct in this action. This seems to be 
a pattern with him, and needs to end. People have rights 
and the State makes laws for everyone including the District 
Attorneys office. 
Dated this 20th day of July, 1995. 
Terence Lee Parker 
Attorney Pro Se 
Appellant 
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